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HOBBY LOBBY, CORPORATE LAW, AND THE THEORY OF 
THE FIRM: WHY FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS ARE 
RFRA PERSONS 
Alan J. Meese∗ and Nathan B. Oman∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.1 is shaping up to be the 
blockbuster case of the Supreme Court’s October 2013 Term.  The 
2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) requires 
most companies with fifty or more employees to provide such workers 
health insurance, including women’s “preventive care and screenings.”2  
In August 2011, the Health Resources and Services Administration de-
termined that such care includes “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration 
approved contraceptive methods [and] sterilization procedures,”3 in-
cluding medications that some consider abortifacients.  Over 300 plain-
tiffs who object to artificial contraception, abortion, or both have filed 
dozens of lawsuits challenging the contraception mandate under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).4  Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., is one such plaintiff. 
RFRA provides that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability.”5  This protection is not absolute.  Instead, 
RFRA allows the government to burden a person’s religious exercise 
when doing so is the least restrictive means of furthering a “compelling 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗  Ball Professor of Law & Cabell Research Professor, William & Mary Law School. 
 ∗∗  Professor of Law & Taylor Research Professor, William & Mary Law School.  The authors 
wish to thank Darian Ibrahim, Michael Helfand, Jayne Barnard, and David Skeel for helpful 
comments on previous drafts.  Conversations with Lan Cao, Tara Grove, Alli Orr Larsen and 
Hannah Smith were also helpful.    
 1 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148, § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. 119, 
131 (2010).  It should be noted that some entities with more than fifty employees are nonetheless 
exempt from this mandate.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 3 Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., 
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Apr. 25, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/U8R4-VKSW. 
 4 See HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited Apr. 25, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KAW4-RWQR (summarizing various cases challenging the ACA’s contraception 
mandate). 
 5 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006). 
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governmental interest.”6  Hobby Lobby, a business co-owned by five 
family members, contends that the mandate to provide contraceptive 
care contravenes its owners’ understanding of Christianity and thus 
substantially burdens religious exercise. 
 The case raises many issues.  Does the mandate substantially bur-
den Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise?  If so, is the requirement the 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest?  Questions 
like these are beyond the scope of this essay, which addresses a single 
issue: Do corporate law principles preclude a for-profit corporation like 
Hobby Lobby from qualifying as a RFRA “person”?  The Obama 
Administration contends that, for various reasons, Hobby Lobby is not 
a RFRA person.7  For instance, the Administration asserts that treat-
ing for-profit corporations as RFRA persons contravenes 
“[f]undamental [t]enets of American [co]rporation [l]aw.”8  One set of 
amici — forty-four corporate and criminal law scholars — elaborated 
on this latter argument.9  These scholars contend that treating corpora-
tions as RFRA persons that exercise their shareholders’ religion con-
tradicts basic principles of corporate law and would undermine that 
law’s goals.  In particular, they claim that corporations are distinct le-
gal entities, protected from intrusion by shareholders who enjoy lim-
ited liability behind the corporate veil.  These essential attributes of 
corporateness, they say, preclude shareholders from exercising their re-
ligion under the aegis of the corporate form. 
 This essay argues that these scholars are mistaken.10  In the real 
world, shareholders impose religiously motivated policies on corpora-
tions all the time.  This is no surprise, given a theory of the firm that 
emphasizes the contractual nature of corporate law.  That law, in turn, 
empowers shareholders to unify corporate ownership and control and 
thus exercise the ordinary prerogatives of business ownership 
themselves.  There is simply no essence of corporateness that pre-
cludes shareholders with such prerogatives from employing for-profit 
corporations to exercise their religion. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 7 Brief for the Petitioners at 15–22, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. 
Jan. 10, 2014). 
 8 Id. at 23; see also id. 23–26. 
 9 See Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers, Hobby Lobby, No. 13-354 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2014) [hereinafter “Law Professors’ Brief”]. 
 10 We are not the only corporate scholars to take issue with the Law Professors’ Brief.  See, 
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Essay, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Brief in Hobby 
Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2014).  Professor Bainbridge critiques 
the brief’s application of the doctrine of reverse veil piercing.  We do not address reverse veil 
piercing and, for reasons made clear below, we do not think that the viability of a for-profit cor-
poration’s claim under RFRA turns on this doctrine.  
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We make three basic claims.  First, corporate law does not discour-
age for-profit corporations from advancing religion.  Second, such 
businesses do not undermine the goals of corporate law, nor would it 
undermine such goals to grant these firms religious exemptions from 
otherwise neutral laws in appropriate cases.  Third, given the plausible 
reasons for protecting religious exercise by for-profit corporations, 
there is no reason to reject the most natural reading of RFRA’s text, 
namely that “person” includes private corporations of all kinds.  This 
does not mean, of course, that every RFRA claim by a for-profit corpo-
ration should be successful.  In some cases there will be no substantial 
burden on religious practices, and in other cases the government may 
have a compelling reason for regulating corporations.  RFRA, howev-
er, does not assign the task of weeding out such undesirable religious 
exemptions to the definition of “person.”  Rather, other statutory provi-
sions do that work.11   
Part I of this essay provides background on RFRA and the debate 
over for-profit corporations.  Part II considers religious for-profit cor-
porations and examines the claim that such corporations violate corpo-
rate law or undermine its goals.  Part III explains why society should 
protect religious exercise by for-profit corporations. 
 I.  RFRA PERSONHOOD, FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS,  
AND THE SCHOLARS’ CLAIMS 
As noted in the introduction, RFRA prevents unjustified interfer-
ence with religious exercise by “persons.”  The most natural reading of 
the term “person” in RFRA includes for-profit corporations.  Congress 
passed RFRA in response to Employment Division v. Smith,12 which 
abandoned application of strict scrutiny to neutral laws burdening re-
ligious exercise.13  Because RFRA implements a previous constitution-
al rule, one could seek the meaning of “person” in constitutional prece-
dent.  As Justice Brennan explained, “by 1871, it was well understood 
that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all 
purposes of constitutional and statutory analysis.”14  Thus, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held that for-profit corporations are con-
stitutional “persons.”15  Furthermore, the so-called “Dictionary Act,” 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (requiring a substantial burden on religious exercise and 
allowing regulations creating such a burden in the case of a compelling government interest). 
 12 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 13 Id. at 889; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006) (articulating Congressional purpose to 
restore strict scrutiny of neutral laws that substantially burden religious exercise); id. 
§ 2000bb(a)(4) (finding that Smith nearly eliminated strict scrutiny of such laws).  
 14 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 687 (1978).  
 15 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (unanimous treatment of corpora-
tion as a person); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (same); 
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which defines terms appearing in the U.S. Code, provides that, “unless 
the context indicates otherwise,” the term “person” includes corpora-
tions, partnerships, and other entities, “as well as individuals,” without 
regard to whether such firms or individuals are engaged in profit-
seeking activities.16 
The Dictionary Act’s language allowing a different meaning when 
“the context indicates otherwise” does not authorize judges to fashion 
optimal definitions of “person” on a statute-by-statute basis.  The Act’s 
presumption is stronger than that.  Instead, the Supreme Court has 
characterized the “context” caveat as a sort of escape hatch that courts 
may employ if, and only if, the Act’s definition of person “seems not to 
fit” with the statute in question.17  In such cases, the Court has said, 
the context caveat and resulting departure from the Dictionary Act’s 
definition of person can save the courts from “forcing a square peg into 
a round hole.”18 
Nonetheless, the Obama Administration and amici claim that “per-
son” does not include for-profit corporations.19  The scholars properly 
assume that Hobby Lobby’s shareholders are the true source of reli-
gious exercise by the corporation.20  However, they contend that basic 
principles of corporate law distinguish corporations from other busi-
ness enterprises and forestall shareholders from this use of the corpo-
rate form.  The scholars emphasize that corporations are entities legal-
ly separate from their shareholders.21  This separate existence, they 
say, creates limited liability, an “impermeab[le]” barrier protecting 
shareholders’ personal assets from corporate creditors.22  
Taken together, the scholars say, these fundamental attributes cate-
gorically preclude shareholders from using corporations for religious 
exercise.23  In fact, the scholars contend that Hobby Lobby’s share-
holders are trying to “have it both ways.”24  By choosing to invest in a 
for-profit corporate enterprise, shareholders obtain benefits of the cor-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888) (same); 
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844) (holding that a 
corporation is a “citizen” within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution). 
 16 See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, compa-
nies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individu-
als . . . .”). 
 17 Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 200 (1993). 
 18 Id. 
 19 See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text (recounting position by the Administration and 
amici that for-profit corporations are not RFRA persons). 
 20 See Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
 21 Id. at 3–10. 
 22 Id. at 7 (invoking the “impermeability of the corporate veil”). 
 23 Id. at 13–16. 
 24 Id. at 14. 
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porate form, including limited liability.25  However, these same share-
holders seek to ignore the separateness of the corporation to use it as a 
conduit for their religious beliefs.26  Allowing shareholders’ religion to 
“pass through” to the corporation, the scholars say, would create “an 
unprecedented and idiosyncratic tear in the corporate veil.”27  The 
Court should not, they contend, read RFRA to empower controlling 
shareholders to “impose their personal religious beliefs” on  
corporations.28 
The scholars do not address the Dictionary Act’s definition of “per-
son” or other federal laws granting for-profit corporations conscience 
rights.29  Rather, they suggest that RFRA coverage of for-profit corpo-
rations would burden commerce by encouraging intracorporation 
struggles over religious identity, struggles that would sometimes result 
in litigation, and thereby discourage investment.30 
II.  RELIGIOUS BUSINESSES AND CORPORATE LAW 
The scholars claim that the legal attributes of corporations disable 
them from exercising the religion of their owners, who cannot “reverse 
veil pierc[e]”31 to impose their views on the firm.  We take a different 
view.  For-profit corporations embodying shareholders’ religions are 
common, passing without corporate law objections.  This is unsurpris-
ing given religious diversity in the United States and corporate law’s 
enormous flexibility.  The structure of corporate governance is contin-
gent and contractual, enabling shareholders of closely held corpora-
tions to unify ownership and control and exercise the same preroga-
tives as owners of non-corporate businesses, such as partnerships.  
While such closely held firms retain limited liability and entity status, 
neither attribute justifies denying shareholders of such entities the 
right to advance religion while earning a profit.  Treating such entities 
as RFRA persons “fit[s]” just fine within RFRA and does not “forc[e] a 
square peg into a round hole.”32 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 Id. at 6, 14. 
 26 Id. at 13–14. 
 27 Id. at 8.   
 28 Id. at 22. 
 29 See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(2)(A) (2006) (protecting the rights of individuals and entities re-
ceiving public health funds to decline to perform abortions on “the basis of religious beliefs or 
moral convictions”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-22(j)(3)(B)(i), 1396u-2(b)(3)(B)(i) (2006 & Supp. V) (man-
aged care or Medicare+Choice organization may decline abortion coverage if it objects “on moral 
or religious grounds”).   
 30 See Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 19–22. 
 31 Id. at 17.  
 32 Cf. Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 200 (1993) (discussing definition of a “per-
son” under the Dictionary Act). 
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 A.  The Ubiquity of Shareholder Imposition of Religion 
Some lower courts have asserted that “for-profit, secular corpora-
tions cannot engage in religious exercise.”33  As an empirical matter, 
this claim is false.  Shareholder-induced pursuit of religion is common.  
Religion infuses much of American commerce, “includ[ing] a $4.6 bil-
lion Christian products industry, a $12.5 billion kosher food market, 
and a growing share of an $800 billion global sharia-compliant finance 
market.”34  Moreover, numerous mutual funds confine investments to 
firms whose activities reflect investors’ religious precepts.35 
Of course, not all religiously infused commerce reflects sharehold-
ers’ imposition of religious beliefs.  Some of that commerce, however, 
certainly does.  Consider the following nonscientific sample.  A kosher 
supermarket owned by Orthodox Jews challenged Massachusetts’ 
Sunday closing laws in 1960.36  For seventy years, the Ukrops Super-
market chain in Virginia closed on Sundays, declined to sell alcohol, 
and encouraged employees to worship weekly.37  A small grocery store 
in Minneapolis with a Muslim owner prepares halal meat and avoids 
taking out loans that require payment of interest prohibited by Islamic 
law.38  Chick-fil-A, whose mission statement promises to “glorify God,” 
is closed on Sundays.39  A deli that complied with the kosher stand-
ards of its Conservative Jewish owners challenged the Orthodox defi-
nition of kosher found in New York’s kosher fraud law,40 echoing a 
previous challenge by a different corporation of a similar New Jersey 
law.41  Tyson Foods employs more than 120 chaplains as part of its ef-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 678 (2013). 
 34 Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 2015) (footnotes omitted).  
 35 See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2013) 
(describing such funds). 
 36 See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 618 (1960) (“Appel-
lees are Crown Kosher Super Market, a corporation whose four stockholders, officers and direc-
tors are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith . . . .”). 
 37 See James Leasure, Ukrop’s Christian Values Out the Door with Sale to Ahold, RICHMOND 
EVANGELICAL EXAMINER (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/article/ukrop-s-christian-
values-out-the-door-with-sale-to-ahold, archived at http://perma.cc/EM5J-FREY; David Wil-
kinson, Ukrop’s CEO Walks the Ethics Talk, ETHICS DAILY (Aug. 23, 2002, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.ethicsdaily.com/ukrops-ceo-walks-the-ethics-talk-cms-1446, archived at 
http://perma.cc/F2XM-U9RZ. 
 38 See Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 75–76 (2013) (describing this business). 
 39 Frequently Asked Questions: Corporate Information, CHICK-FIL-A, http://www.chick-fil-
a.com/FAQ#?category=2 (last visited Apr. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/372U-59V4 (de-
scribing firm’s mission “[t]o glorify God” and explaining why Chick-fil-A restaurants close on 
Sundays).   
 40 See Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415, 419–20 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 41 See Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353, 1355–56 (N.J. 1992). 
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fort to maintain a “faith-friendly” culture.”42  New York City is home 
to many Kosher supermarkets that close two hours before sundown on 
Friday and do not reopen until Sunday.43  A fast-food chain prints ci-
tations of biblical verses on its packaging and cups.44  A Jewish entre-
preneur in Brooklyn runs a gas station and coffee shop that serves on-
ly Kosher food.45  Hobby Lobby closes on Sundays and plays Christian 
music in its stores.  The company provides employees with free access 
to chaplains, spiritual counseling, and religiously themed financial ad-
vice.  Moreover, the company does not sell shot glasses, refuses to al-
low its trucks to “backhaul” beer, and lost $3.3 million after declining 
to lease an empty building to a liquor store.46 
Nearly all of these corporations are owned by one or just a few 
shareholders, and their shares do not trade in public markets, with the 
result that they are considered "closely held."47  These shareholders 
nonetheless enjoy limited liability and each firm is a separate legal 
person.  In each case (and presumably many others), shareholders have 
imposed their religious beliefs on the corporation.  Tellingly, the schol-
ars’ brief does not cite a single case challenging such actions on corpo-
rate law grounds. 
The role of religion in these and other corporations is not surpris-
ing.  Americans are the most religious people in the developed world.48  
Many religions emphasize “living one’s faith,” even in a business set-
ting.  With the rise of general incorporation statutes after the Civil 
War, any entrepreneur may use the corporate form.  Corporations 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 Faith In the Workplace, TYSON FOODS, http://www.tysonfoods.com/Ways-We-Care/Faith-
In-The-Workplace.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5X57-93FA. 
 43 See, e.g., Our Mission Statement, ARON’S KISSENA FARMS, http://www.kissenafarms.com/ 
mission-statement.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/CJS8-TLTS; see 
also Contact, EMPIRE KOSHER, http://www.empirekosher.com/contact (last visited Apr. 27, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4DAS-KMXD; THE KOSHER MARKETPLACE, 
http://www.thekoshermarketplace.com/Home.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SN6D-82C7. 
 44 See Lynn Arave, In-N-Out Serves Burger With a Side of Scripture, DESERET NEWS (Dec. 
26, 2009, 12:15 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705379755/In-N-Out-serves-burgers-
with-a-side-of-scripture.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GS24-HJPC.  
 45 See Rienzi, supra note 38, at 74–75.    
 46 Id. at 77–78; see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 
2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (describing ways that owners “allow their faith to guide 
business decisions”). 
 47 See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 24–25 (1986) (defining closely held corpora-
tions).  One exception is Tyson Foods, which is publicly traded.  See Investor FAQs, TYSON 
FOODS, http://ir.tyson.com/investor-relations/investor-overview/investor-faqs/default.aspx (last 
visited April 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WC6Z-83HA. 
 48 Matthew Hay Brown, U.S. is Most Religious in Industrialized World, BALT. SUN (Dec. 16, 
2009, 4:28 PM), http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/news/faith/2009/12/united_states_is_most_ 
religiou.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L77G-J6KG. 
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whose owners “impose their personal religious beliefs” on the firm are 
common. 
B.  Religious For-Profit Businesses Do Not Violate Corporate Law 
The examples above are inconsistent with the claim that an im-
permeable barrier prevents shareholders from mixing commercial and 
religious objectives.  The largely contractual nature of corporate law 
explains the existence of such businesses.  Investors may alter default 
rules in various ways that contradict the essentialist version of the for-
profit corporation invoked by the scholars’ brief. 
Classical economics assumes that firms unite ownership and con-
trol, concentrating decision-making authority and economic conse-
quences in the same hands.49  The scholars’ vision of the corporation 
rejects such unification, at least when it comes to religious exercise, by 
driving a wedge between owners and the corporation.  Corporate 
owners, they say, simply lack the power to impose their religious views 
on the firm.50  This vision parallels the “standard” corporation, charac-
terized by passive shareholders and management centralized in a 
board of directors.51  As others have explained, the success of such en-
terprises depends on a clear boundary between owners and manag-
ers.52  Such separation of ownership from control results in benefits 
from specialization that would be forgone if each shareholder of Exx-
onMobil, for instance, could seek to impose its individual preferences 
on the firm. 
However, this variant of the corporation is just that: a variant.  All 
corporations are not ExxonMobil.  Indeed, the vast majority of corpo-
rations are closely held.53  Corporate law is not a set of immutable 
government commands issued on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to those 
who wish to incorporate.  The most prevalent theory of the firm teach-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781–83 (1972). 
 50 See supra notes 9 and 19–28 and accompanying text. 
 51 See CLARK, supra note 47, at 2; id. at 762 (referring to this “standard model” of the corpora-
tion). 
 52 Id. at 2 (explaining how these attributes facilitate “the efficient aggregation of very large 
amounts of capital from numerous investors and the efficient operation of a very large business”). 
 53 According to the United States Census Bureau, more than 5.8 million corporations filed fed-
eral tax returns in 2008.  See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, tbl. 745 (2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6NR6-QWHZ.  Only a tiny fraction of these firms are publicly traded.  See Dan 
Strumpf, U.S. Public Companies Rise Again, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2014, 3:43 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304851104579363272107177430 (last visited 
May 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/M99A-XCBJ (reporting that the number of publicly 
traded American corporations peaked at 8884 in 1997); see also JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, I. CORPORATIONS § 1.20 (2d ed. 2003) (“Most of the incorporated enterprises in this 
country, perhaps 90 percent or more, are close corporations . . . .”).   
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es that firms are nexuses of contracts among suppliers of labor, capital, 
and other inputs.54  Corporate law reflects this contractual vision.  
Thus, the law that facilitates the formation of large public corporations 
consists of default rules that parties can change in various ways.55  
The same corporate law that facilitates the creation of ExxonMobil al-
so facilitates formation and operation of the local bed and breakfast 
with a single shareholder. 
Hobby Lobby’s five shareholders manage the corporation “in a 
manner consistent with Biblical principles” they unanimously share.56  
Courts and commentators have often characterized such a closely held 
corporation as a “chartered partnership,” “incorporated partnership,” 
or “a corporation de jure and a partnership de facto.”57  Indeed, some 
courts once resisted treating such enterprises as corporations at all, 
precisely because the shareholders ignored the separation of ownership 
from control and other attributes of corporate personality, instead be-
having like co-partners.58  This resistance has collapsed, however, and 
corporate law now provides methods for contracting around the poten-
tial separation of ownership from control that characterizes large pub-
licly held corporations.  Far from excluding shareholders from control 
of an artificial entity, these tools grant shareholders the same preroga-
tives as owners of noncorporate enterprises like partnerships. 
The most obvious vehicle for imposing shareholder views on the 
corporation is the corporate charter.  Many charters empower the cor-
poration to pursue any lawful business or purpose, and state laws pro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 See generally R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937); Scott 
E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON & ORG. 181 (1988) (explaining how parties 
could replicate the various attributes of firms by contract). 
 55 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW, 1–39 (1991). 
 56 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quota-
tion mark omitted).  
 57 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT THOMPSON, 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 1.2 
(rev. 3d ed. 2004) (quoting Juan L. Luna, Jr., Protection of Minority Interests Through Stockhold-
ers’ Agreements: A Commentary on Section 9 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, 28 
PHILIPPINE L.J. 506, 535 (1953)); CLARK, supra note 47, at 25 (“[L]awyers sometimes refer to 
[closely held corporations] as incorporated partnerships.”); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of 
New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512  (Mass. 1975) (“[T]he close corporation bears striking 
resemblance to a partnership.  Commentators and courts have noted that the close corporation is 
often little more than an ‘incorporated’ or ‘chartered’ partnership.”).  
 58 See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 57, § 4:4; see also Jackson v. Hooper, 75 A. 568, 571 
(N.J. 1910) (“The law never contemplated that persons engaged in business as partners may in-
corporate, with intent to obtain the advantages and immunities of a corporate form, and then, 
Proteus-like, become at will a copartnership or a corporation . . . . They cannot be partners inter 
sese and a corporation as to the rest of the world.”); RODMAN WARD, JR. ET. AL., FOLK ON THE 
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW XIV-42 (4th ed. 2006) (reporting that shareholders 
in closely held firms often ignore requirement to elect a board of directors). 
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vide this default option.59  However, those who set up the corporation 
may adopt a charter reflecting shareholder views about what business 
the firm conducts and how to conduct it.60  Under Delaware Law, for 
instance, the charter may include “[a]ny provision for the management 
of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, 
and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the pow-
ers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class 
of the stockholders.”61  The only exception is for provisions that are 
“contrary to the laws of this State.”62 
Thus, charters may presumably include provisions limiting what 
products the firm may sell (for example, only Halal or Kosher food, no 
tobacco, no alcohol, no armaments, only fair-trade products), where it 
may sell, and on what days it may operate (for example, the firm may 
not operate on the Sabbath).63  The charter could also include provi-
sions requiring the firm to charge “reasonable prices” (as legislation 
creating corporations once did) or pay “fair wages.”64  Moreover, the 
charter may contain aspirational provisions, such as a requirement 
that the firm conduct business in a manner respectful of the environ-
ment or consistent with God’s plan.  Each would “impose the views” 
of the founding shareholders on the corporation.  Some might even re-
duce profits.65  None of these provisions would contravene the laws of 
Delaware, which allow corporations to pursue any “lawful purpose.”66  
The same may be said of charter provisions imposed midstream.  
Granted, directors must propose such changes before a shareholder 
vote.67  However, in closely held firms, directors and shareholders are 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2014) (empowering corporations to adopt such pro-
visions).  We look to Delaware to inform our discussion because of the state’s leading role in  
generating American corporate law.  We also note that the law of Oklahoma, where Hobby Lobby 
is incorporated, sometimes replicates Delaware Law verbatim.  See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, § 1006.A.3 (2013) (authority of the board of directors). 
 60 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3).   
 61 Id. § 102(b)(1); see also id. § 102(a)(3) (charter may impose “express limitations” on “lawful 
acts and activities”).   
 62 Id. § 102(b)(1).  Presumably the laws of Delaware include federal law, such as RFRA and 
the ACA.  See Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136–37 (1876). 
 63 See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 53, § 3.13 (suggesting that participants in “closely 
held enterprises” may consider “narrowly restricting the purpose of the corporation” and “insert-
ing . . . ‘self-denying’ clauses to exclude the corporation from specified lines of activity or limit 
some of [its] powers”).  
 64 Cf. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 59–60 (1873) (describing statute incor-
porating the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company and establishing 
maximum charges for each animal slaughtered).   
 65 See Aaron Blake, Obama Praises CVS’s Decision to Stop Selling Cigarettes, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 5, 2014, 7:26 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/02/05/ 
obama-praises-cvss-decision-to-stop-selling-cigarettes/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z6K9-UGRB.  
 66 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 101(b) (2014). 
 67 See id. § 242(b). 
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often one and the same.68  Moreover, shareholders may simply elect di-
rectors who promise to propose such amendments.  Here again, a 
straightforward application of garden-variety corporate law empowers 
shareholders to employ the corporation as a tool for furthering their 
religious beliefs. 
Shareholders may accomplish the same objective by amending the 
bylaws on their own initiative.  Such amendments may include “any 
provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorpo-
ration, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its af-
fairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockhold-
ers, directors, officers or employees.”69 
Indeed, shareholders in closely held corporations need not amend 
the charter or bylaws to implement their religious views.  They may 
also enter shareholder agreements constraining the firm.  Delaware, for 
instance, provides that such agreements are enforceable, even if they 
“restrict or interfere with the discretion or powers of the board of di-
rectors.”70  Courts have enforced shareholder agreements that required 
unanimous shareholder consent for hiring employees,71 conducting “all 
corporate operations,”72 or entering particular types of agreements.73  
An agreement that a restaurant will not open Sunday or not violate 
Kosher restrictions without unanimous consent would impose the 
shareholders’ religious beliefs.74 
Shareholders may also eliminate directors altogether and vest 
themselves with operational control over the corporation.  Delaware’s 
close corporation statute, in a section entitled “Management by stock-
holders,” expressly authorizes charter amendments providing “that the 
business of the corporation shall be managed by the stockholders of 
the corporation rather than by a board of directors.”75  This provision 
allows firms to replicate the management and ownership structure of a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 68 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (identifying shareholders serving on firm’s board). 
 69 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2014); see also Michael A. Schaeftler, The Purpose Clause 
in the Certificate of Incorporation: A Clause in Search of a Purpose, 58 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 476, 
477 (1984) (contending that shareholders may prefer bylaw changes to “limit corporate activities”).      
 70 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (2014); see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPO-
RATION ACT § 7.32 (enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements). 
 71 See Klausman v. Rosenberg, 143 S.E.2d 164 (Ga. 1965). 
 72 Adler v. Svingos, 436 N.Y.S.2d 719, 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). 
 73 See Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980) (applying Delaware law). 
 74 Shareholders who enter such agreements accept whatever liability directors would incur for 
actions or omissions mandated by such agreements.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (2014).  
We think it unlikely that unanimous agreements imposing religiously motivated policies would 
give rise to successful claims.  See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.  The sole exception 
may be for agreements that exacerbate a firm’s losses in or near insolvency, imposing financial 
costs on creditors.  
 75 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2014). 
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partnership.76  Such manager-shareholders would still owe fiduciary 
duties, nominally to the corporation.77  However, we know of no au-
thority (and the scholars cite none) holding that such a fiduciary’s reli-
ance on religious or other ethical considerations ipso facto breaches 
these duties.  Indeed, religiously motivated decisions may sometimes 
increase profits, though some such decisions may reduce them.78  
While some case law suggests that fiduciaries must unalterably max-
imize shareholder profits,79 we believe that shareholders can waive any 
such rule, like other default rules.80  No decision of which we are 
aware holds that managers must maximize profit over the unanimous 
objection of the shareholders, who can amend the charter to validate 
any such choice.81  Indeed, corporate law even empowers shareholders,  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 76 See WARD, supra note 58, at XIV-42–43 (explaining operation of this provision and opin-
ing that it will be most attractive for family owned corporations); infra note 80 and accompanying 
text (discussing Delaware statute confirming that a corporate charter  may properly confer on 
shareholders the management prerogatives of partners). 
 77 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351. 
 78 See Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70, 77 (2013) (explaining that adherence to religion may increase a 
firm’s costs). 
 79 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).  But compare 1 AM. LAW INST., 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.01(b)(2) (1994) (corporations may implement “ethical considerations that are reasonably re-
garded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business” despite impact on profits).  
 80 See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733 (2005). 
81 Some readers of a previous draft suggested that the business judgment rule can bolster 
shareholders’ ability to impose religiously motivated policies, by sheltering from judicial review 
any practice with a minimally plausible prospect of increasing profits.  See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 
237 N.E. 2d 776, 778–80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).  We agree that directors who decide that a corpora-
tion will not provide particular health insurance benefits could readily avoid duty of care liability 
by claiming that such a decision reduces the cost of employee benefits.  Cf. id. at 780 (rejecting 
duty of care challenge based upon judicial speculation about financial consequences of challenged 
practice).  In the same way, a decision not to operate on Sunday could reduce costs and enhance 
the firm’s ability to recruit employees.  Indeed, some religiously motivated practices that unques-
tionably increase costs could nonetheless survive business judgment scrutiny because they could 
plausibly differentiate the firm’s product and increase market demand for it.  See Tushnet, supra 
note 78, at 78 (suggesting that adherence to religious norms may help a firm claim a market 
niche).  
 Nonetheless, we believe the business judgment rule is beside the point in this context.  Nei-
ther shareholders nor directors need invoke pretextual commercial rationales to justify practices 
that are in fact motivated by religious beliefs.  For, as explained in the text, modern corporate law 
empowers shareholders to induce corporations to pursue religious objectives overtly and regard-
less of whether the resulting policies maximize profits.  Moreover, shareholders that induce corpo-
rations to adopt religiously motivated policies would presumably lack standing to challenge direc-
tors’ adoption of such policies, thereby rendering the business judgment rule superfluous. Indeed, 
invocation of the business judgment rule “proves too much” from our standpoint, as the rule could 
in some cases protect directors who adopt policies contrary to the religious beliefs of shareholders, 
so long as such policies have some plausible connection to profit making.  Finally, we note that a 
firm’s reliance on the business judgment rule and concomitant invocation of profit-oriented ra-
tionales for such practices could needlessly undermine subsequent assertions that such practices 
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by unanimous vote, to ratify alleged corporate waste.82 
In sum, modern corporate law provides shareholders of closely held 
corporations with numerous tools for structuring the firm to mirror the 
allocation of responsibilities in other forms of business enterprises, in-
cluding partnerships.  Indeed, Delaware expressly empowers share-
holders to employ these devices to “treat the corporation as if it were a 
partnership or to arrange relations among the stockholders or between 
the stockholders and the corporation in a manner that would be ap-
propriate only among partners.”83  Such devices obliterate any bound-
ary between ownership and control.  No fiduciary duties or other man-
ifestations of corporate separateness constrain such shareholders from 
exercising the very same ownership prerogatives as members of a 
partnership.  Instead, there is simply no distinction relevant to the ex-
ercise of religion between the nexus of contracts known as the partner-
ship and that known as the closely held corporation. 
To be sure, shareholders of such “incorporated partnerships” would 
still retain limited liability, unlike partners, and the firms themselves 
would continue to enjoy entity status for transactional or other pur-
poses, unlike the partnerships they otherwise mimic.  However, any 
claim that these attributes preclude use of the corporate form to fur-
ther shareholders’ religion does not withstand analysis, for two rea-
sons.  First, the argument proves too much.  Many synagogues, 
churches, and mosques are also incorporated.84  Like for-profit corpo-
rations, they are “artificial legal entities.”85  Many also have members 
who, like shareholders, enjoy limited liability.86  Some even engage in 
commercial activity.87  Such entities possess First Amendment rights, 
and even the Obama Administration admits that non-profit “religious 
corporation[s]” could be RFRA persons.88  The scholars’ brief does not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
are in fact forms of sincere religious exercise protected by RFRA. 
 82 ROBERT S. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 152–
53 (2014). 
 83 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (2014). 
 84 See WILLIAM W. BASSETT ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 1:19 
(2013); EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 
2010) (referring to Hosanna-Tabor as “an ecclesiastical corporation”), rev’d on other grounds, 132 
S. Ct. 694 (2012) 
 85 See, e.g., 1A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 25 (“The distinctness of the corporate entity applies equally to all 
kinds of corporations,” and “nonprofit corporations . . . like other corporations, are legal entities 
separate from their members.”). 
 86 MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS AND AS-
SOCIATIONS § 4.01 (2004) (stating that limited liability for members of non-profit corporations “is 
a fundamental principle of the general law relating to corporations”). 
 87 See COX & HAZEN, supra note 53, § 1.18 (“Many non-profit organizations engage in profit-
making activities.”).  
 88 See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 7, at 17–21; see also, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that local ordinance abridged non-profit 
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explain this anomaly but instead expressly declines to address the ap-
plication of its logic to not-for-profits.89 
Second, and more fundamentally, nothing about limited liability or 
entity status justifies stripping corporations, whether for-profit or non-
profit, of their religious personhood.  Take limited liability.  Limited 
liability is a default rule.  Corporations can amend their charters to 
eliminate it or redefine its extent.90  Moreover, market forces often in-
duce shareholders in closely held firms to guarantee the firm’s debts.91  
Indeed, unlimited liability by owners of non-corporate entities is also 
largely a default rule; partners sometimes pay higher interest rates in 
return for “non-recourse loans” that shelter personal assets from busi-
ness creditors.92 
Shareholders’ ability to pursue their religious values via the corpo-
rate form should not turn on whether they have forsaken limited liabil-
ity.  As the scholars have explained, states adopt limited liability to en-
courage economic activity.93  While this policy may lose its force with 
respect to “incorporated partnerships,” that ship sailed long ago, as 
states granted limited liability regardless of size or governance struc-
ture chosen by shareholders.  Nothing in the rationale for limited lia-
bility, furthermore, provides a reason for limiting the ability of a firm’s 
owner to use the corporation as a vehicle for religious activity.  No 
one, for instance, claims that sole proprietors who bargained with all 
creditors for limited liability would thereby create a barrier that pre-
vented them from using their business to further religion.  Metaphors 
aside, whether a particular shareholder’s personal assets (if any) are 
available to satisfy the firm’s creditors seems normatively irrelevant to 
shareholders’ ability to infuse corporations with their religious values. 
Limited liability is of course an economic benefit to those share-
holders who: (1) have significant personal assets; and (2) invest in firms 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
corporation’s free exercise of religion); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 492 (1979) 
(construing National Labor Relations Act narrowly so as not to infringe free exercise rights of “the 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a corporation sole . . . [and] the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 
Inc.”); O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(en banc) (per curiam) (holding that ban on controlled substances violated rights of religious cor-
poration and its members), aff’d 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca 
Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 89 See Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 1, n.2 (“[T]his brief does not specifically address 
non-profit corporations, limited liability companies or partnerships.”). 
 90 See DEL. CODE ANN tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (2014). 
 91 See CLARK, supra note 47, at 25. 
 92 See Larry Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 
112–13 (1991). 
 93 See Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 5 (limited liability encourages “entrepreneurial 
activity by founders, investment by passive investors, and risk taking by corporate managers”). 
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whose activities could give rise to involuntary creditors.94  As such, 
limited liability is economically indistinguishable from other institu-
tions that limit a debtor’s liability.  Indeed, most Americans enjoy lim-
ited liability from tort victims in the form of homestead and other ex-
emptions that often shield most individuals’ assets from creditors.95  
Such individuals do not forfeit their right to exercise religion.  Nor 
should limited liability deprive shareholders and corporations of rights 
under RFRA. 
What about the corporation’s status as an artificial entity?  As oth-
ers have explained, entity status is simply a legal fiction that facilitates 
transacting and the assertion of legal rights by an enterprise that ag-
gregates the capital of multiple investors.96  Thus, entity status mimics 
any number of institutional mechanisms that reduce transaction costs 
and thus facilitate commercial activity.  The alternative, a grand bar-
gain negotiated by the firm’s entire population of shareholders each 
time the firm transacted, would entail large and needless transaction 
costs.  However, the state’s creation of a useful institutional device 
does not forestall individuals from employing that device to exercise 
religion. 
In short, the scholars’ argument rests on  an essentialist characteri-
zation of an institution defined by an immutable set of status relation-
ships, relationships that categorically distinguish every corporation 
from partnerships and other business entities.  This essentialist vision 
flies in the face of corporate law’s contractual and enabling nature, as 
understood through the lens of the nexus-of-contracts theory of the 
firm.  There is no single model of corporate governance and concomi-
tant relationship between shareholder, managers, and creditors.  Nor is 
there any fundamental distinction between closely held corporations 
(“incorporated partnerships”) and the partnerships or sole proprietor-
ships they mimic.  Instead, as the Supreme Court unanimously recog-
nized over a century ago: “Under the designation of ‘person’ there is 
no doubt that a private corporation is included.  Such corporations are 
merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose and 
permitted to do business under a particular name and have a succes-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 94 Shareholders in closely held firms internalize the impact of limited liability for voluntary 
corporate debts, as firms pay higher interest rates that reduce corporate earnings.  To this extent, 
the “benefit” of limited liability is illusory. 
 95 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (exempting the entirety of an individual’s home, regard-
less of value, from the claims of creditors).  Federal law similarly limits the ability of tort victims 
and other creditors to garnish wages, effectively conferring limited liability over exempt wages.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2012) (limiting wage garnishment to twenty-five percent of disposable 
wages or the excess of disposable earnings above thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage, 
whichever is less). 
 96 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 55, at 11–12 (describing how entity status re-
duces the cost of transacting in the corporate context). 
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sion of members without dissolution.”97  Including corporations as 
RFRA persons is no more an anomaly than including partnerships, 
sole proprietorships, or other business enterprises.98  Absent some 
claim — which the scholars do not make — that (attempted) profit-
making simpliciter deprives entities of RFRA personhood, for-profit 
corporations are, like non-profit corporations, RFRA persons. 
 By focusing on closely held corporations such as Hobby Lobby, we 
do not mean to suggest that publicly held firms cannot be RFRA per-
sons.  The Dictionary Act, after all, does not distinguish between close-
ly held corporations, publicly held corporations, and those that may lie 
somewhere in between.  Instead, the statute designates (all) “corpora-
tions” as persons, suggesting a unitary result.  Given that the vast ma-
jority of corporations are, like Hobby Lobby, closely held firms, the 
most logical result is RFRA personhood for all.99 
 Indeed, shareholders of firms that are publicly held and character-
ized by a nominal separation of ownership from control can nonethe-
less employ some of the mechanisms described above to ensure that 
firm policies reflect their religious beliefs.  For instance, shareholders 
could approve amendments to the firm's charter or alter the firm’s by-
laws so as to mandate religiously motivated policies such as closing on 
Sunday.  In the real world, of course, reliance on such mechanisms 
may be relatively rare.  Shareholders of publicly held firms are likely 
quite diverse in their religious views (or lack thereof), and market pres-
sure may deter large firms with diverse consumers and employees from 
adopting a particular religious stance.  Still, while rare, we do not be-
lieve that such assertions are impossible.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 97 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888). 
 98 To be sure, the absence of any meaningful difference between corporations and partnerships 
does not ipso facto establish that corporations are RFRA persons, absent some demonstration that 
partnerships are themselves RFRA persons.  However, the Dictionary Act expressly defines part-
nerships as “persons,” thus raising a presumption of RFRA personhood.  United States v. A & P 
Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958) (relying upon Dictionary Act’s definition of “whoever” to im-
pose criminal liability upon a partnership).  Moreover, neither the scholars nor the Obama Ad-
ministration identifies any attribute of partnerships qua partnerships that renders conferral of 
RFRA personhood on such entities “awkward” or analogous to “forcing a square peg into a round 
hole.”  Cf. Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 200 (1993).  All that remains is the argu-
ment, adumbrated by the Administration, but not made by the scholars, that attempting to make 
a profit deprives even sole proprietors of RFRA personhood.  See Brief for the Petitioners, supra 
note 7,, at 19–22.  Pre-Smith law points in the other direction, however.  See United States v. Lee, 
455 U.S. 252 (1982) (entertaining free exercise claim by sole proprietor); Gallagher v. Crown Ko-
sher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1960) (entertaining free exercise claim by for-profit 
corporation); infra note 112 (detailing various opinions in Crown Kosher).  Assuming that for-
profit entities can be RFRA persons, exclusion of for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby 
would be awkward and illogical. 
 99 See supra note 53 (explaining that the vast majority of corporations are closely held). 
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 To be sure, publicly held firms that do invoke RFRA in an effort to 
avoid regulation may face more obstacles than closely held corpora-
tions.  It may, for instance, be more difficult for such firms to demon-
strate that the asserted religious belief is sincere or that the challenged 
imposition is a substantial burden on the exercise of that belief.100  
Moreover, regulation of large, public firms may more readily satisfy 
RFRA’s compelling interest test.101  Put another way, RFRA gives 
courts various tools for addressing any unique challenges posed by 
public corporations.  There is thus no apparent rationale for categori-
cally depriving such firms of RFRA personhood. 
 It would be strange to deal with any such unique challenges by ad-
justing RFRA’s definition of “person” instead of invoking other doctri-
nal tools.  When it comes to religious activity by natural persons, 
RFRA does not differentiate meritorious from non-meritorious claims 
by manipulating the statutory definition of person to exclude individu-
als with insincere claims or identify instances in which regulation ad-
vances a compelling government interest.  Rather, courts treat individ-
uals invoking RFRA as “persons” for purposes of the statute and use 
other doctrinal tools to filter out baseless claims.102  In the same way, 
courts should resist any urge to exclude public corporations from 
RFRA personhood and rely upon other doctrinal tools to handle any 
special challenges arising from such firms’ invocation of RFRA. 
C.  Religious For-Profit Businesses Do Not  
Undermine Corporate Law Policies 
 One might still argue that religious for-profit corporations under-
mine the goals of corporate law.  The scholars claim that religion 
“could make the raising of capital more challenging, recruitment of 
employees more difficult, and entrepreneurial energy less likely to 
flourish.”103  Elsewhere they suggest that injecting religion “would in-
vite contentious shareholder meetings, disruptive proxy contests, and 
expensive litigation regarding whether the corporations should adopt a 
religion and, if so, which one.”104  Likewise they claim that allowing 
such corporations to claim religious exemptions would create incen-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 100 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006) (articulating RFRA’s “substantial burden” standard); 
infra notes 129–135 and accompanying text (describing decisions under both RFRA and the Free 
Exercise Clause determining whether a claimant’s religious belief was sincere). 
 101 See id. § 2000bb-1(b) (articulating RFRA’s compelling interest test). 
 102 See infra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining that courts should employ such tools 
to identify meritless claims). 
 103 Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 8. 
 104 Id. at 9. 
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tives to manufacture religious beliefs to avoid regulations.105  We find 
these arguments unconvincing. 
As explained earlier, for-profit corporations have been asserting re-
ligious identities in the marketplace for decades.106  Likewise we need 
not leave entirely to speculation the probable results that will follow if 
corporations are found to be RFRA persons and thus not barred from 
seeking an exemption from generally applicable laws.      
  Federal law and the laws of some states already authorize some 
for-profit corporations to decline to perform or pay for certain medical 
procedures because of religious or moral objections.107  We also have 
experience with the application of strict scrutiny to religious for-profit 
corporations.  In 1963, the Court held in Sherbert v. Verner108 that 
strict scrutiny applied to neutral laws burdening religious exercise.109  
Until the Court’s 1990 Smith decision, courts applied this standard as 
a matter of constitutional law.110  Corporations have long held rights 
under the First Amendment,111 including the Free Exercise Clause.112  
For-profit corporations have sued on Free Exercise grounds both be-
fore and since Smith.113  The experience with state law is also instruc-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 105 Id. at 25–28. 
 106 See Part II.A, supra. 
 107 See note 29, supra; see also, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(d) (2014) (“Except for a facility 
devoted exclusively to the performance of abortions, no medical personnel or medical facility . . . shall 
be required against his or its conscience to aid, abet or facilitate performance of an abortion or dispens-
ing of an abortifacient . . . .”). 
 108 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 109 See id. at 403.   
 110 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899–900 (1990) (O’Connor, J. concurring in 
the judgment) (collecting numerous Supreme Court decisions applying strict scrutiny to facially 
neutral burdens on religion).   
 111 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (unanimously protecting free speech 
rights of for-profit corporation). 
 112 See e.g. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (recognizing Free Exercise 
Clause as applying to a religious corporation); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian 
Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (same). 
 113 See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether for 
profit corporation could assert free exercise rights and rejecting free exercise arguments made by 
the corporation and its owners); EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 619 (9th Cir. 
1988) (holding that defendant corporation was an “instrument” through which its shareholders 
could exercise religion and assert free exercise claims).  Indeed, in Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Su-
per Market of Massachusetts, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1960), all nine Justices addressed the merits of 
the plaintiff corporation’s free exercise challenge to the state’s Sunday closing law, in four differ-
ent opinions.  See id. at 618 (Warren, C.J., joined by Black, Clark, and Whittaker, JJ.); id. at 642 
(Brennan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (concluding that the law abridged plaintiffs’ free exercise 
rights); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1960) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J., 
joined by Harlan, J.); id. at n.† (noting that the opinion also applied to Crown Kosher Super Mar-
ket, Inc.); McGowan, 366 U.S. at 561 (Douglas, J. dissenting) (concluding that law abridged plain-
tiffs’ free exercise rights); id. at n.*.  No Justice suggested that the plaintiff’s status as a for-profit 
corporation deprived the firm of free exercise rights.  See, e.g., Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 
366 U.S. at 630–631 & 631 n.7 (declining to consider procedural objections to plaintiff’s chal-
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tive.  In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. 
Flores114 striking down RFRA as applied to state law, fifteen states 
passed their own state versions of RFRA.115  All of these statutes pro-
tect “persons.”  Only two states — Louisiana and Pennsylvania — ex-
plicitly limit persons to non-profit corporations,116 while South Caroli-
na explicitly defines persons to include “an individual, corporation, [or] 
firm.”117  Courts in at least one state have entertained state RFRA 
claims by for-profit corporations.118  For over half a century, then,  
there has been no per se bar to free exercise claims by for-profit corpo-
rations, and the parade of horribles envisioned by the scholars has 
simply not materialized.119  For-profit corporations have been asserting 
religious identities in commercial and legal arenas for decades.  Others 
have declined the opportunity to do so.  There has been no flood of 
shareholder derivative suits challenging a firm’s adoption of a religious 
identity or failure to adopt such an identity.  In fact, the scholars do 
not cite a single example of a corporate governance dispute connected 
to such decisions.  In closely held corporations with a single sharehold-
er, the structure for many religious businesses, the fear of such litiga-
tion is especially fanciful.  Even if such decisions did lead to occasional 
litigation, the mere possibility of corporate conflict would provide no 
reason for prohibiting corporate religious exercise.  On matters ranging 
from business plans to corporate social responsibility (or its absence), 
corporations often engage in controversial actions.  These matters have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
lenge).  Some intermediate state appellate courts have held, however, that for-profit corporations 
cannot assert rights under the Free Exercise Clause.  See, e.g., Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, 
Inc., 373 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Atlantic Dep’t Store, Inc. v. State’s Att’y for Prince 
George’s Cnty., 323 A.2d 617 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).  Neither decision, it should be noted, 
mentions or discusses Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc. 
 114 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 115 See W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE 
LAW § 2:63 (2013) (collecting statutory references).  
 116 See 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (2014) (“‘Person.’  An individual or a church, association of 
churches or other religious order, body or institution which qualifies for exemption from taxation 
under [federal law].”); LA. REV. STAT. § 5234(1) (2013) (“‘A person’ includes an individual and 
also includes a church, association of churches or other religious order, body or institution which 
qualifies for exemption from taxation under [federal law].”). 
 117 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-20(3) (2014) (“‘Person’ includes, but is not limited to, an indi-
vidual, corporation, firm, partnership, association, or organization.”). 
 118 See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 901 N.E.2d 373 (Ill. 2008) (reversing a lower court 
dismissal of a for-profit corporation’s suit asserting claims under state RFRA, state conscience 
laws, and the Free Exercise Clause); Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Quinn, 976 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2012) (considering a challenge to a state law brought by a for-profit corporation on, inter alia, 
state RFRA grounds). 
 119 David Skeel, Corporations and Religious Freedom, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2012, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EB6F-FYBM (expressing doubt that a Supreme Court ruling in favor of Hobby 
Lobby will lead to “a massive wave of corporate religious freedom claims”). 
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resulted in reported cases.120  We do not prohibit, however, corpora-
tions from planning their business or from implementing corporate so-
cial responsibility programs.  Rather, we provide firms with discretion 
and let people vote with their pocketbooks. 
There remains the claim that religious firms might suffer difficulty 
raising capital, finding employees, or otherwise achieving entrepre-
neurial success.  The first response to this claim is to ask, “So what?”  
The survival of such firms in the market shows they are able to attract 
capital and labor.  Hobby Lobby is apparently a thriving enterprise.  
Furthermore, corporate law does not punish behavior simply because 
it might increase costs.121  As one commercially sophisticated judge has 
observed, “The courtroom . . . is not a boardroom.  The judge is not a 
business consultant.”122  Firms engage in costly behavior such as clos-
ing on Sunday or alienating employees by refusing to provide contra-
ception coverage,123 just as corporations may also choose to sell expen-
sive “fair trade” goods or donate substantial sums to philanthropy.124 
Furthermore, religion may sometimes solve economic problems.  
Religion can lower agency costs, a common problem in the corporate 
context.125  For example, commercial networks of coreligionists are 
common.  Religious homogeneity generates the trust on which these 
networks depend.  First, coreligionists monitor and informally sanction 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 120 See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (upholding corporate chari-
table donation to a university); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (rejecting 
challenge to board’s refusal to schedule night games).  Shlensky, of course, declined to interfere 
with the “honest business judgment” of the directors.  See id. at 778.  As explained in note 81, su-
pra, we disclaim any reliance upon the business judgment rule to support this essay’s arguments 
 121 See CLARK, supra note 47, at 136–40 (noting the discretion of managers under the deferen-
tial business judgment rule). 
 122 In re Colonial Ford, 24 B.R. 1014, 1016 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (quoting In re Curley Valley 
Associates, 14 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123 See, e.g., Why We’re Closed on Sundays, CHICK-FIL-A, http://www.chick-fil-
a.com/Company/Highlights-Sunday (last visited Apr. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NAZ9-
GY42; Igor Volsky, Many Catholic Universities, Hospitals Already Cover Contraception in Their 
Health Insurance Plans, THINKPROGRESS.ORG (Feb. 7, 2012, 9:04 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2012/02/07/420114/many-catholic-universities-hospitals-already-
offer-contraception-as-part-of-their-health-insurance-plans/, archived at http://perma.cc/RQ9-
JYAQ (noting Boston College “chose to meet the needs of the overwhelming majority of Catholic 
women and offer these much needed services”); see also Tushnet, supra note 78, at 77–78 (conclud-
ing that adherence to cost-increasing religious norms may generate offsetting psychic income). 
 124 See, e.g., Fair Trade FAQ, ALLEGRO COFFEE, http://www.allegrocoffee.com/about/more-
info/our-story#faq (last visited Apr. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/U6G5-Q8WQ (“Allegro 
offers Fair Trade certified coffee . . . .”); Jacquelyn Smith, America’s Most Generous Companies, 
FORBES, July 16, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/07/16/americas-most-
generous-companies/, archived at http://perma.cc/TA2U-7DWT (noting that in 2012 Wells Fargo 
donated $315,845,766 in cash while Walmart, Inc. donated $311,607,280 in cash and $755,868,381 
in products to about 50,000 different charities). 
 125 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 55, at 11–12 (discussing the problem of 
agency costs in corporations). 
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one another.  For example, the diamond business depends on high-cost, 
low-margin transactions in goods that are extremely easy to steal.  It 
requires enormous trust to function profitably.  Orthodox Jews domi-
nate the wholesale industry in America and depend heavily on reli-
gious sanctions to insure trustworthy behavior.126  Second, costly reli-
gious devotion often signals commitment to community norms.127  
Counter-parties may rely on religious observance as a low-cost signal 
of trustworthiness.  To be sure, the frequency of religious affinity fraud 
suggests that religion also can be used opportunistically, but in many 
situations it is sufficiently accurate to be a rational response to more 
expensive systems of sorting and monitoring.  This does not mean that 
religious businesses are insincere.  Rather, the role of religion in gener-
ating trust suggests that religious businesses may survive precisely be-
cause religion solves economic problems. 
 Finally, the scholars’ brief raises the specter of corporations manu-
facturing fictitious religious identities to obtain regulatory exemptions.  
They write, “Companies suffering a competitive disadvantage will 
simply claim a ‘Road to Damascus’ conversion.  A company will adopt 
a board resolution asserting a religious belief inconsistent with what-
ever regulation they find obnoxious . . . .”128 
This concern has nothing to do with the corporate form.  Natural 
persons can also make insincere religious claims.129  Sole proprietor-
ships and partnerships may also desire regulatory exemptions.  Some 
version of strict scrutiny has been applied to free exercise claims for 
over half a century, and courts considered the sincerity of religious be-
liefs even before that.130  The scholars suggest that it would be unprec-
edented for courts to inquire into whether challengers are engaging in 
religious practices in “good faith,” citing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Thomas v. Review Board131 for the proposition that federal courts 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 126 See Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish 
Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006) (discussing the role of reli-
gion in generating intra-industry trust in the diamond trade); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the 
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 
(1992) (discussing extralegal enforcement in part through religious sanctions in contracting in the 
American diamond industry). 
 127 See Laurence R. Iannaccone, Why Strict Churches are Strong, 99 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1180 
(1994) (arguing that strict religious behavior acts as a signal of commitment and prevents oppor-
tunism in religious communities). 
 128 Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 27–28.  We presume that the Scholars are not imply-
ing that Saint Paul’s conversion to Christianity was insincere.  See Acts 9:1–6.  Certainly the Ro-
mans who executed him believed that his conversion to Christianity had been sincere.  
 129 See infra note 134 (collecting cases). 
 130 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (holding that a court could not judge the 
truth of theological beliefs but it could judge whether or not a person held those beliefs in good 
faith). 
 131 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
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lack expertise in making such judgments.132  This, however, is a mis-
statement of the law.  The courts have consistently held that they lack 
the competence to evaluate the truth of theological claims or the accu-
racy of a particular litigant’s interpretation of their faith.133  This task 
is entirely separate, however, from the question of whether a litigant’s 
asserted religious beliefs are sincerely held.  Courts applying RFRA 
have not infrequently evaluated such sincerity.134  Insincerity is a good 
reason for denying a RFRA claim in particular cases.  But the possibil-
ity of such insincerity does not justify categorically excluding for-profit 
corporations from RFRA’s reach.135 
III.  RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CORPORATIONS 
One might object that it just makes no sense to apply RFRA to for-
profit corporations, with the result that courts should not treat such 
entities as RFRA persons.  Corporations aren’t natural persons and re-
ligious freedom, properly understood, applies only to natural per-
sons.136  There are two responses to this claim.  The first is that corpo-
rations are instrumentalities by which people act in the world.  When 
individuals act religiously using corporations they are engaged in reli-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 132 See Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 27 n.12. 
 133 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (“[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts 
from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice.”); Watson 
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871) (stating that civil courts lack jurisdiction to resolve theological 
questions). 
 134 See Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The sincerity of a plaintiff’s 
belief in a particular religious practice is an essential part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case un-
der . . . RFRA.”); United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting as insincere 
an individual’s claim to believe that marijuana was a deity entitling him to a RFRA exemption 
from criminal drug laws); United States v. Manneh, 645 F. Supp. 2d 98 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting 
defendant’s RFRA challenge to ban on importation of parts of endangered primates after finding 
that defendant’s claimed religious need to eat “bushmeat” was insincere). 
 135 The scholars also claim that divining sincerity in the corporate context is particularly diffi-
cult, pointing to Hobby Lobby as an example.  See Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 28 
(“The evidence [of religious belief] typically will be no more, and no less, than what is present in 
this case: the views of shareholders that the regulation burdens their personal beliefs and a board 
resolution adopting those beliefs as the corporation’s own.”)  The facts in the case, however, belie 
this claim.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text (summarizing Hobby Lobby’s extensive re-
ligious activities). 
 136 See, e.g., Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul: The Business Entity Law Re-
sponse to Challenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 
(2014) (“[I]t is claimed that the religious beliefs of the organization itself are violated by the Man-
date.  This argument fails because a business organization does not have religious beliefs.  Rather, 
as it has been famously put, ‘a corporation has no soul.’”); David Clay Johnston, Do Corporations 
Have Religious Beliefs, AL-JAZERA AMERICA (Mar. 28, 2014, 7:00 AM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/hobby-lobby-firstamendmentreligiousrightsobama 
care.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ASQ5-BU3G (arguing that “a corporation cannot exercise 
religion or have any beliefs because it is merely an inanimate vessel, a box, as it were, to contain 
liability for debts, for misconduct and even for criminality, thus shielding its owners”). 
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gious exercise.  When we regulate corporations we in fact burden the 
individuals who use the corporate form to pursue their goals.  We of-
ten have very good reasons for doing so, but we should not be seduced 
by the fiction of corporate personality into imagining that when we 
regulate corporations we are not regulating individuals.  The second 
response is that religious freedom is broader than an individualist con-
cern with personal rights.  Rather, it is about limiting the ability of the 
state to regulate a particular kind of conduct — religious exercise — 
even when corporate bodies engage in that conduct.  Just as free 
speech is about restraining the government from regulating speech, 
even of for-profit corporate entities like The New York Times, so too 
religious freedom is about restraining the government from regulating 
religious conduct, including that by corporate entities. 
Like the rules of contract law or the rules governing the alienability 
of property, corporate law’s main purpose is facilitative.  As Delaware 
puts it, a corporation can be formed for “any lawful business or pur-
poses.”137  Corporations are a tool.  They are a means for pursuing the 
ends chosen by their creators.  Like any other legal tool, such as con-
tract or property, corporations can be regulated by the state.  These 
regulations burden the activity of those that choose to use corpora-
tions.  For the sake of convenience or to pursue some discrete policy 
we often treat corporations as separate persons.  This is a pragmatic 
decision, however.  It is not because corporations belong to some cate-
gory of things whose interests are divorced from the interests of natu-
ral persons.138  There is no reason Congress cannot selectively treat 
corporations as tools used by individuals rather than separate persons.  
Congress employs just such selective treatment in taxing S-
corporations, ignoring the legal personality of corporations for tax pur-
poses.139  Likewise, when it passed RFRA Congress did not limit the 
term “person,” and it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that its failure 
to do so reflected a recognition that for-profit corporations are a way 
that people in our society do in fact pursue religious objectives.140 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 137 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 101(b) (2014). 
 138 See generally John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 
35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926) (arguing that legal personality ought to be understood primarily as a 
pragmatic device rather than a metaphysical essence). 
 139 See 26 U.S.C. § 1363 (2012). 
 140 Several lower courts have suggested that standing doctrine precludes RFRA challenges to 
the regulation of corporations.  See Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 621 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(“As to the Kennedys, we agree with the government that they lack standing as individuals to 
bring RFRA claims arising from an obligation on their closely-held corporation.”); Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 387 
(3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct. 678 (2013) (holding that a corporation cannot assert the 
Free Exercise rights of its owners under the First Amendment).  Some courts have concluded (er-
roneously) that for-profit corporations are not RFRA persons.  However, even these courts con-
cede that when a for-profit corporation claims that it has been regulated in violation of federal 
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One might object that by definition people create for-profit corpo-
rations to make a profit and thus such corporations cannot be instru-
mentalities for religious exercise.  As noted above, as an empirical mat-
ter this claim is false.  A moment’s reflection also reveals its 
impoverished psychology.  People’s motives are mixed.  Entrepreneurs 
wish to earn a profit, but they often have more grandiose ambitions to 
change the world.  It’s unsurprising that some people pursue a reli-
gious mission as part of their business.  One might object that if profits 
are involved, the exercise cannot “really” be religious.  After all, didn’t 
Jesus declare, “You cannot serve God and mammon”?141  As Professor 
Michael Helfand has observed, however: 
  This opposition of profit and religion — the claim, essentially, that re-
ligion ends where business begins — is deeply misguided.  It may trace to 
a particular brand of Christian theology — a dogmatic view of what it 
means to “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s” — that relegates religion 
to the narrow confines of the church and the inner life of the mind.  Reli-
gion, on this account, simply does not apply in the marketplace or the 
boardroom.   
  Such a worldview is completely foreign to other faith traditions, nota-
bly the Jewish legal tradition.  From the perspective of Jewish law, Juda-
ism’s requirements apply equally in all spheres of human endeavor — 
from the synagogue to the workplace and everywhere in between.142 
This worldview is also completely foreign to many non-Jewish tradi-
tions, including to many Christians.143 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
law, the corporation alleges an injury that would grant it standing under Article III, even if the 
court ultimately disagrees with the corporation’s interpretation of federal law.  See, e.g., Autocam, 
730 F.3d at 621 (“[W]e agree with the parties . . . that Autocam has Article III standing to assert 
RFRA claims.”).  Some commentators have suggested that corporations may also have prudential 
third-party standing to assert the First Amendment or RFRA claims of their owners.  See, e.g., 
Matthew I. Hall & Benjamin Means, Essay, The Prudential Third-Party Standing of Family-
Owned Corporations, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 151 (2014).  We do not believe, however, that 
Hobby Lobby presents any need for such involved standing analysis.  RFRA rights are a creature 
of statute and thus conferred by an act of Congress.  Congress conferred these rights on for-profit 
corporations by adopting the capacious definition of “person” contained in the Dictionary Act and 
expressly authorizing such “persons” to seek judicial relief.  See  1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1(c) (2006).  Article III presents no standing barrier when a corporation invokes such a 
statutory right to mount such challenges.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains 
of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before . . . .”). 
 141 Matthew 6:24 (King James). 
 142 Michael A. Helfand, Obamacare and Religious Rights in a For-Profit World, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 18, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/18/opinion/la-oe-helfand-hobby-lobby-
supreme-court-religious-20140319, archived at http://perma.cc/J2ZD-DYCV. 
 143 See, e.g., PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE & PEACE, VOCATION OF THE BUSINESS 
LEADER: A REFLECTION ¶ 10 (2012)  (“Dividing the demands of one’s faith from one’s work in 
business is a fundamental error . . . .”);  LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, FERAMORZ Y. FOX & DEAN 
L. MAY, BUILDING THE CITY OF GOD 2 (2d ed. 1992) (describing Mormon teachings and prac-
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Some might object that religion is less central to a believer’s activi-
ties in the for-profit context, thus weakening the case for free exercise 
claims of businesses.  This is likely true for many businesses.  Howev-
er, this is equally true of for-profit corporations and natural persons, 
who may engage in religious activity while trying to make a living.  
RFRA deals with such concerns by requiring that the burden on reli-
gion be “substantial,” not through the definition of “person.”  Likewise, 
one might argue that corporations, because they can allow individuals 
to amass wealth and power, present situations in which the need for 
regulation is particularly acute.  This is also surely true.  However, 
RFRA deals with such concerns through the “compelling interest” test, 
not the definition of “person.”  We have no doubt that regulations 
sometimes place only a minimal burden on religious exercise and that 
regulations sometimes advance compelling interests.  Dealing with 
such cases, however, by expanding or contracting the definition of 
“person” under the statute makes no sense.  For example, it is true that 
sometimes natural persons will challenge laws that do not place a sub-
stantial burden on religious exercise or that  serve a compelling gov-
ernment interest.  In such cases it would make little sense to avoid the 
problem of granting religious exemptions by claiming that the plain-
tiffs are not “persons” for purposes of RFRA.  Rather, such concerns 
are dealt with elsewhere in the statute.144 
When thinking about religious freedom it is easy to slip into the as-
sumption that only individual rights matter.  Religious freedom, how-
ever, need not end with such rights.  There are numerous instances in 
our law where protecting religious freedom involves limiting govern-
ment control over corporate entities.145  Most recently, for example, the 
Court held in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 
School v. EEOC146 that the First Amendment prohibited the state 
from regulating the relationship between a religious corporation and 
its “ministerial” employees.147  Likewise, numerous statutory provisions 
exempt religious corporations from generally applicable laws.148  Given 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tices aimed at “reorganizing . . . economic patterns of life” in order to “build unity among a people 
fragmented by their individualistic search for economic well-being”). 
 144 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2006) (requiring a substantial burden on religious exercise 
and allowing regulations creating such a burden in the case of a compelling government interest). 
 145 See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding the validity of the religious-institution exemption from Title 
VII as applied to a religious organization’s secular activities); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (recognizing Free Exercise Clause as applying to a corporation); Kedroff v. 
Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (same). 
 146 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 147 Id. at 702–07. 
 148 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e1 (2006 & Supp. V) (exempting any “religious corporation, asso-
ciation, educational institution, or society” from certain applications of Title VII); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 548(a)(2) (2012) (exempting certain charitable donations to religious organizations from the 
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that religion is often an expression not only of individual conscience 
but also of religious communities, this is unsurprising.  It points, how-
ever, toward an understanding of religious freedom that need not de-
pend on individual rights. 
Consider the analogy of freedom of speech.149  The New York Times 
is a for-profit corporation that enjoys legal protections under the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, even when publishing paid 
advertisements.150  We might strain to understand this entirely in 
terms of individual rights.  Perhaps we limit the government’s ability 
to regulate what the Times publishes to vindicate the expressive rights 
of various individuals.  On this view, we are only concerned about 
government regulation of the corporation’s speech because it might in-
cidentally burden individuals.  However, we can also think of speech 
as a valuable social activity.  We are better off, as Holmes suggested, 
with a robust “marketplace of ideas”151 where matters of public con-
cern are debated.  Discussion is an inherently social activity.  Its pres-
ence or absence doesn’t hinge on the legal identity of the speakers.  
The New York Times is not valuable because its pages involve the in-
dividual exercise of expressive rights.  Rather, it is valuable because it 
contributes to public discussion.  On this view, public discussion is not 
a byproduct of individual rights.  Rather, individual rights are one 
among several mechanisms — including free speech rights for corpora-
tions — by which we foster public discussion.152 
Likewise, we can think of religious freedom as limiting government 
control over religious activity rather than as protecting only individual 
rights.153  On this view, what is important about religious activities by 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
bankruptcy code’s fraudulent conveyances statute); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. (2006 & Supp. V) 
(The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006 & 
Supp. V) (stating that “corporations . . . operated exclusively for religious . . . purposes” are ex-
empt from income taxation). 
 149 For an argument that institutions play a key role in advancing free speech values, see Fred-
erick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005); see also 
Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 
1749–50 (2007) (arguing that institutions should play a larger role in constitutional thinking). 
 150 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964).   
 151 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the search for truth is best served by “the competition of the market” between ideas). 
 152 Professor Jack Balkin, for example, has argued that “[f]reedom of expression . . . is part of 
something much larger: Let’s call it knowledge and information policy.  The word ‘policy’ may be 
a misnomer, because people often oppose policy to rights and rights discourse.  We don’t have to 
do that, though.”  Jack M. Balkin, Address at the Second Access to Knowledge Conference at 
Yale University, Two Ideas for Access to Knowledge: The Infrastructure of Free Expression and 
Margins of Appreciation (April 27, 2007) (transcript available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/ 
04/two-ideas-for-access-to-knowledge.html). 
 153 Several scholars have also argued that institutions should play a larger role in free exercise 
jurisprudence.  See generally Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sover-
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corporations is that they are religious.  There are a number of reasons 
to limit the government’s control over religious activity.  We proclaim 
“no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in . . . religion.”154  It does not follow that our society should treat reli-
gion as irrelevant.155  Religion is a virtually universal human experi-
ence, even in secular milieus that define themselves in terms of the ne-
gation of religious claims.156  In a pluralistic society, people and 
communities need space in which to test differing modes of religious 
experience — including the religious experience of agnosticism and 
atheism.  This experience becomes a collective social resource in trying 
to understand and structure our spiritual worlds.  The piling up of 
such experience, however, is only possible if the government gives the 
religious marketplace the kind of breathing room that it gives to the 
free-speech marketplace of ideas. 
It is also a brute social fact that people practice religion collectively.  
To protect religion only within the confines of personal conscience or 
individual action would do great violence to lived religion.  It is not 
possible for a Catholic to be a Catholic wholly independent of the 
structures of the Catholic Church and its sacraments.157  Likewise, for 
an Orthodox Jew certain prayers can only be said in the context of a 
minyan consisting of ten adult Jewish men.158  The government cannot 
refuse to protect collective religious actions while protecting individual 
actions without favoring some religious traditions over others.  Finally, 
to the extent that religious freedom is grounded purely in a pragmatic 
judgment that social peace is more likely to be maintained if the gov-
ernment avoids regulating religion, it cannot avoid the reality of corpo-
rate religious activity. 
One might accept the importance of protecting religious activity 
but deny that for-profit corporations should receive such protections.  
We disagree.  Many for-profit corporations are infused with religious 
values and religious missions.159  Some for-profit corporations are sole-
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ly owned by churches.  The owners of these corporations can feel 
called on to infuse their business activities with religious values.160  In 
other cases, businesses exist to fulfill explicit religious missions.  Reli-
gious publishing houses devoted to propagating religious messages 
provide a good example.161  Finally, many believers deny that religion 
is sharply limited to the non-commercial realm.  Islam, for example, 
prohibits riba, the taking of interest, and a multi-billion dollar industry 
exists to provide Muslim investors with sharia-compliant investment 
instruments.162  Likewise, the New Testament speaks about the treat-
ment of debtors,163 the relationship between employers and employ-
ees,164 and the proper religious attitude toward money.165  Religion 
speaks to the totality of what constitutes a good and faithful life.  In a 
liberal polity, we rightly wish the government to refrain from making 
spiritually ambitious claims, thus maintaining a space where others 
can work out such concerns without the heavy hand of the state. 
CONCLUSION 
For-profit corporations infused with their owners’ religion are 
common.  These businesses do no violence to corporate law, which is 
primarily contractual and facilitative, allowing firms, including those 
that are closely held, to adopt provisions best suited to their needs.  
There is no evidence that these businesses generate greater corporate 
dysfunction than their secular counterparts.  It is true that society 
treats corporations as legally distinct persons for some purposes, but 
this is a pragmatic choice rather than a normative judgment that hu-
man concerns do not apply to such firms.  Corporations are just means 
by which groups of people pursue common purposes, and acknowledg-
ing the exercise of religion by for-profit corporations is by no means a 
category mistake.  Nor, given that corporations can be formed for “any 
lawful purpose,” do shareholders violate some social compact by ac-
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cepting the benefits of the corporate form while pursuing both profits 
and religious values.  Of course, granting religious exemptions from 
otherwise applicable laws raises the risk of opportunism and can un-
dermine important governmental policies.  These risks are present 
with natural persons as well, however.  RFRA deals with these con-
cerns not by narrowing the definition of “person,” but instead by scru-
tinizing only those burdens on religious exercise that are substantial 
and allowing compelling interests to justify such burdens in appropri-
ate cases.  Simply put, corporate law provides no reason for excluding 
for-profit corporations from RFRA. 
 
